

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

4 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
SUBJECT : Transition Arrangements

1. We think it important that you see the President-elect personally as soon as possible. I probably should accompany you or, if you prefer and he is willing, see him myself. Our alternative is for me to deal with Stu Eizenstat, but there would be problems with this. He cannot speak for Carter, his future role is not yet defined, and there are some things that ought to be said directly to Carter.

2. If we are able to see Carter, we should be prepared to do the following:


a. Establish channels for liaison with him, the Vice-President elect, and their staffs.

b. Seek his agreement to some or all of the agenda attached to this memorandum, but especially the assignment of a personal briefing officer.

c. Inform him of the National Foreign Intelligence Program and its relationship to the budgets of DoD, CIA, etc.



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f. Brief on important recent developments, if any justify it.

g. Respond to questions on recent intelligence related stories in the media, e.g., Backfire, Letelier.

3. You will remember that in 1968 we established a beachhead in New York to provide briefings and other services to the Nixon Administration as it formed. We never saw Nixon, but did have almost daily contact with Kissinger and Mitchell. In dealing with the Carter team, there are two cautions we should keep in mind, both deriving from this experience.

a. We have the foundations for an excellent relationship with Carter and his Administration. Many of his appointees, however, are likely to be both ignorant of intelligence capabilities and highly suspicious of intelligence activities and of CIA in particular. Our stance should be forthcoming, as open as possible, but not pushy. *How briefing of Nixon, ch.*
Above all, we should not talk down to the new people or tell them how to do their business.

Our problems in '68 stemmed partly from our ignorance of the character of the Nixon staff and its pervasive hostility toward the bureaucracy, partly from the cocksureness, if not arrogance, with which some of our number approached them. Kissinger was informed, for instance, that he should not read raw cables, but rather should rely on CIA to tell him what he needed to know. We also sought to put our own officer in charge of the White House Situation Room, on grounds that only CIA could do this right. (The proposal was and probably still is a good one, but it apparently came across to the Nixon people as an effort by CIA to control them.)

b. The whole world closes in on a President-elect and his staff. The pressures from people who have ideas, or things, or themselves, to sell are enormous. The telephone switchboards break down. Calls are never returned. Messages do not reach the addressee. The staff, acutely conscious of the rapidly diminishing time before Inauguration,

not to overload and not to expect too much time from overworked staff. Their now orderly plans will almost certainly be disrupted by the pressures they will undergo. Under such circumstances, it will be most desirable to install our briefing officer inside the Secret Service compound as a recognized part of the team. Otherwise his access will probably be minimal.

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4. [] has seen a draft of this memorandum and his suggestions have been incorporated.

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Richard Lehman

Attachment

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